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Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis                                             No. 23       10 January 2010




     Ukraine
   After the Orange Revolution – political stability
   necessary for economic recovery
   • Ukraine’s presidential election on 7 February appears to have
      been a democratic success. Viktor Yanukovich, who was
      removed as president during the Orange Revolution, is the
      apparent winner. There is a big risk that political turbulence
      will persist, however, since Yulia Tymoshenko, the other
      candidate, continues to have support in parliament.
   • Ukraine’s economy bottomed out last fall and significant
      challenges still remain. The real economy has benefitted from
      a rise in global demand for commodities, while inflation and
      the exchange rate have stabilised. Huge imbalances persist,
      however. The budget deficit continues to grow and the natural
      gas sector is struggling with significant losses and increasing
      liabilities. Households have been hurt by rising
      unemployment, real wage decreases and an increase in real
      debt burdens. The necessary economic reforms will continue
      to hurt households in the short term.
   • Political co-operation will be critical to macroeconomic
      recovery. But the risks are great. One possibility is that early
      parliamentary elections are called, which would mean another
      election campaign. Greater turbulence remains a possibility.
      An alliance between the candidates would be the best way to
      agree on a difficult and unpopular economic stabilisation
      program to mitigate the crisis. In the medium term extensive
      reforms and liberalisations are needed to produce a higher
      and sustainable economic growth.




             Economic Research Department, Swedbank AB (publ), SE-105 34 Stockholm, tel +46 (0)8-5859 1028
e-mail: ek.sekr@swedbank.se Internet: www.swedbank.se Responsible publishers: Cecilia Hermansson +46 (0)8-5859 1588
               Magnus Alvesson +46 (0)8-5859 3341, Jörgen Kennemar +46 (0)8-5859 1478 ISSN 1103-4897
New president but political uncertainty
prevails
Ukraine appears to have conducted a largely free and fair                            Historic election
election1, and voted the sitting president voted out of office and                   produces new
brought in his replacement during a period of substantial                            president
economic turbulence and global pressures. If the power shift is
orderly, it would be a huge success for democracy in Ukraine,
especially compared with many other former Soviet states. At
the same time, however, politics in Ukraine are still
overshadowed by the involvement of strong economic interests
and by increasing scepticism about the political elite. Voter
turnout is estimated by the election commission at 69%, against
77% in 2004. The key to increasing confidence in the political
system is to strengthen the fight against corruption, while at the
same time improving efficiency in the public sector.

Former opposition leader Viktor Yanukovich appears to have                           Ukraine goes back to
won the second round of the presidential election and returned                       the future for a
to the centre of Ukrainian politics.2 He had been forced out of                      president
the same post in 2004 by the Orange Revolution after winning a
tainted election. Yanukovich’s political career began as a party
functionary during the Soviet era, and he rose after Ukraine's
independence to become prime minister under president Leonid
Kuchma. Yanukovich’s principal support comes from the
Russian-speaking eastern parts of the country, which are
dominated by heavy industry. During the election campaign he
increasingly distanced himself from Russia and expressed his
support for economic stability policies.

Yulia Tymoshenko was unsuccessful in convincing enough                               Conflicts within Orange
voters who in the first round preferred one of the other                             coalition doomed
candidates, and could not mobilising eligible voters that                            Tymoshenko
abstained from voting. As the sitting prime minister and
dominant political figure in recent years, Tymoshenko, together
with outgoing president Viktor Yushchenko, has dropped in
opinion polls as the economy has worsened. At the same time
she has retreated from her previous West- and Europe-leaning
policies. Her efforts to appease Russia through the natural gas
agreement in December and diminished support for NATO
membership appears to be an attempt to attract more Russian-
speaking voters. The growing conflict between the former allies
in the Orange Revolution, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko,
undermined any opportunity either had to become president,
however.




1
 According to election observers from OSCE.
2
 Results showed Yanukovich receiving 49.0% of the votes, against 45.5% for
Tymoshenko. According to news reports, Tymoshenko is considering whether to
demand a recount in certain districts.




2                                                             Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010
Opinion polls and the first round outcome of the presidential election
(Percent of voters)
     45
     40
     35
     30
     25
     20
     15
     10
      5
      0                    09
                           09
           08




                             9


                             9


                             9




                           nd
                             9




                            9


                            9


                            9
                          /0


                          -0


                          -0
                         r/0




                          /0


                          /0


                          /0
                        g/
                        n/
         p/




                       ou
                      ug




                      ov


                      ov


                      ec
                       ct


                       ct
                    ap


                    /j u
       se




                    au




                   -O


                   -O




                    tr
                   /a




                   /n


                   /n


                   /d
                  9/


                 12
     8/




                 4/




                1s
                14


                01


                31


                25


                29


                13
          Viktor Yanukovych    Yulia Tymoshenko     Serhiy Tihipko    Viktor Yushchenko

Source: Various opinion polls and election results from the first round

Despite Yanukovich’s long, and not always flattering, history in                          New president but
Ukrainian politics, there are hopes that his election will break                          uncertainty on new
the paralysis in recent years caused by differences between                               political direction
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. Yanukovich has gathered a
group of advisers who are considered competent and goal-
oriented, and he has changed his position with regard to Russia
and the rest of the world. In addition, Yanukovich has signalled
that he will aim to restore negotiations with the IMF on the
macroeconomic stabilisation program. At the same time he has
stated that Ukraine should remain neutral between Russia and
NATO. He also does not support membership in the EU, but
has pushed for direct contacts in the form of bilateral
agreements on natural gas deliveries, for example.

The parliamentary situation remains complicated. Tymoshenko                               Political paralysis
is prime minister and her bloc of three parties3 has had support                          could persist
since the end of 2008 from the Lytvyn bloc, consisting of two
parties4, as well as from Our Ukraine, the party of the current
president Yushchenko. There have been a number of political
manoeuvrings in recent years. In October 2008 Yushchenko
dissolved parliament, but a new election could not be held after
parliament ruled that it was a violation of the constitution and
refused to grant the necessary financing. Yanukovich, as the
newly elected president, can try to induce members of
parliament to switch sides and support a new government loyal
to him. If Tymoshenko retains her support, there is a significant
risk that the country's leadership will remain bifurcated.
Yanukovich could then call a new election to build a majority for
his policies (provided that parliament accepts this), but this
would mean another election campaign and more political
indecisiveness.

Ukraine faces considerable challenges both political and                                  New political situation,
economic. Corruption in politics and the public sector is                                 but the seriousness of
extensive, and oligarchs, the powerful business owners who in                             the economic situation
many cases built their fortunes during the years following                                requires courage and
independence, have considerable influence. The country also                               compromise
faces decisive choices economically. Despite the high political

3
    All-Ukrainian United Fatherland, Social Democratic and Reforms and Order parties.
4
    People’s Party and Labour Party.




Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010                                                            3
cost, reforms are needed to achieve a turnaround and create
sustainable, dynamic development. This will require a
willingness to compromise on the part of both the newly elected
president and the opposition. Judging by the political climate in
recent years, the likelihood of quick, effective decision-making
is not especially high.


Real economy has bottomed out, but it’s a
long way back
The severe economic slowdown eased at the end of last year.                                                                     Hints of growing
Preliminary data indicate that GDP fell by about 14%. This is                                                                   exports at the end of a
slightly better than expected, but at the same time was one of                                                                  dark year
the largest declines among major economies during the global
downturn. Its dependence on steel exports and heavy industry
made Ukraine vulnerable to the decline in global demand, at the
same time that the financial system faced huge imbalances
after years of rapid credit growth, especially with respect to
loans in foreign currency. The recession bottomed out in the
second half of 2009 and industrial production climbed as
demand from Asia grew. The agricultural sector and food
production have held up better and contribute to a stabilisation
of the domestic economy. Still, the Ukrainian economy is
significantly below its capacity ceiling and major imbalances
remain.

Real sector developments, 2006-2009
              15                                                                                 120
              10
                                                                                                       Index=100, same period




                                                                                                 110
              5
                                                                                                           previous year




                                                                                                 100
              0
    Percent




              -5                                                                                 90
          -10
                                                                                                 80
          -15
                                                                                                 70
          -20
          -25                                                                                    60
                          06-K3                  07-K3           08-K3                   09-K3

                   GDP (ann. change)                      Industrial production (real, r.s.)
                   Agricultural production (real, r.s.)

Source: Ukraine’s national bureau of statistics

The domestic economy continues to struggle. While the export                                                                    The domestic
sector strengthened in late 2009, retail sales fell by over 20% in                                                              economy has been
December 2009 and by an average of 19% for the year. The                                                                        hard hit and is unlikely
low level in 2009 would suggest positive growth numbers in                                                                      to generate growth
2010, but at the same time many households face a difficult
situation, and it will take time to recover to the levels before the
crisis. Unemployment is rising and is expected to hit 9% in
2009, an increase of more than 3.5 percentage points
compared with the previous year. Real wages have eroded and
are estimated to have shrunk by nearly 10% in 2009. Add to
that a growing debt burden, in no small part due to the large
share of loans in foreign currency that many households and
businesses have.




4                                                                                    Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010
At the same time that the current accounts deficit continues to                                                     Despite an improved
decline, capital outflows are rising and a new balance of                                                           current account
payments crisis remains a possibility. The majority of outflows                                                     balance, there is still a
consist of debt service by companies and banks, and since                                                           risk of an external
borrowing costs are increasing, it will be costly to refinance                                                      payment crisis
loans. As a result, the country's currency reserves are
shrinking. Currently there is enough reserves to cover
payments, but the huge outflows are creating uncertainty about
Ukraine’s solvency.

Current account and the exchange rate, 2005-2009
                  10                                                                                          9.0
                  8
                                                                                                              8.0
                  6
 Percent of GDP




                  4
                                                                                                              7.0
                  2
                  0                                                                                           6.0
                  -2
                                                                                                              5.0
                  -4
                  -6
                                                                                                              4.0
                  -8
            -10                                                                                               3.0
                       05-K1   05-K3   06-K1   06-K3     07-K1     07-K3     08-K1    08-K3   09-K1   09-K3

                                       Current account           USD/Hryvnia (r.s.)

Source: Central bank of Ukraine

Despite the turbulence in the financial markets, the Ukrainian                                                      The hryvnia has
currency, the hryvnia, has remained remarkably stable after                                                         stabilised after a sharp
falling substantially in late 2008 and early 2009. The significant                                                  depreciation, but is
inflow of capital from the IMF and other public lenders has                                                         dependent on external
added to the central bank’s reserves and can be used to                                                             support
support the hryvnia, while at the same time growing exports and
falling imports have reduced demand for foreign currency. Of
course this also means that the hryvnia could again come under
pressure without further international support and an
improvement in foreign trade.

Inflation has retreated from an annual level of over 30% in mid-                                                    Falling inflation and
2008 to just over 10% in late 2009. The major depreciation of                                                       low wage increases
the hryvnia, which is giving inflation impulses, is outweighed by                                                   are making Ukraine
weak domestic demand. The central bank has tightened its                                                            more competitive
monetary policy as well. The money supply (M2) fell by 5% in                                                        internationally
2009 at the same time that the credit expansion slowed,
primarily led by the decrease in lending in foreign currency.
Falling inflation, coupled with lower nominal wage increases, is
making Ukraine more competitive.




Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010                                                                                       5
Inflation and wages, 2006-2009
(Annual change in percent)
    50

    40

    30

    20

    10

     0

    -10

    -20
       jan/06 maj/06 sep/06 jan/07 maj/07 sep/07 jan/08 maj/08 sep/08 jan/09 maj/09 sep/09
                                Real w ages     Wages (nominal)      Inflation



Source: Ukraine’s national bureau of statistics



Transit trade in natural gas, a key sector of the Ukrainian                                     Financial deficits and a
economy, has stabilised this winter, but fundamental problems                                   growing debt burden
persist. Imported gas is the primary energy source in Ukraine                                   are making the natural
and significant revenue is generated from the transit trade. Last                               gas sector a ticking
year's natural gas crisis, when Russia shut off deliveries to                                   time bomb
Ukraine, as a result of which large parts of Europe were left
without energy supplies, has not been repeated this year. In
December Prime Minister Tymoshenko signed an agreement
with Russia stretching over 10 years that makes the natural gas
and transit trade more predictable. Naftogaz, the state-owned
energy company, continues to have serious profitability
problems and a considerable debt burden. Last fall the
government, in connection with the election campaign, refrained
from raising energy prices at the consumer level despite that
they represent only about a third of the import cost. As a result,
Naftogaz’s cash flow is insufficient and the state has had to step
in to help it pay its bills.5 Normalising Naftogaz would require
substantially higher energy prices as well as a large capital
infusion to reduce its debt burden. Both measures would be
politically controversial.

The growing budget deficit will be the biggest challenge to meet                                The budget deficit is
following the election. During the campaign, spending was                                       the biggest threat to
allowed to grow. Promises made to large groups such as                                          macroeconomic
pensioners will be difficult to meet without sacrificing                                        stability
macroeconomic stability. Moreover, the government did not
manage to get a 2010 budget passed by parliament. When it
became obvious that the spending increases announced last
fall could not be combined with the economic stability program,
the IMF suspended payments in November 2009. Other
international financiers are following suit and restrain their
support, and uncertainty among many private actors is
increasing.




5
  In December of last year the IMF modified the economic stability programme and
reduced the minimum level for the central bank’s international reserves to allow
foreign payments for natural gas deliveries, among other things, to continue.




6                                                                        Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010
Our macroeconomic forecast is cautious. Despite a slight                Slow economic
improvement late last year, the risks are significant. The political    recovery forecast for
uncertainty is already evident and the global economy shows             Ukraine
no signs of a rapid turnaround. We anticipate positive GDP
growth in Ukraine of 2-3% in 2010 and 2011, while
unemployment is expected to rise above 10% in 2010 before
falling in the latter half of 2011. Uncertainty in the financial
markets will increase pressure on the hryvnia, which is
expected to depreciate slightly. Weak domestic demand will
hold inflation in check, at the same time that higher energy
prices and the weaker currency will create inflation impulses.
Inflation is not expected to drop below 10% until 2011.


Political developments are critical to
economic stabilisation efforts
The political process this spring will be decisive to whether          Three scenarios
Ukraine manages to reverse its stagnation and get its economy
to recover and grow again. There are three plausible scenarios:

   (i) Political cooperation between president and prime               An alliance could lead
   minister: Yanukovich and Tymoshenko agree to work                   to rapid stabilisation of
   together on economic stabilisation policies and succeed in          the economy
   introducing major reforms to reduce the budget deficit and
   reform the energy sector. In this scenario the IMF starts
   reissuing payments at the same time that the private sector
   regains confidence in Ukraine and increases its investments.
   A relatively quick recovery begins and economic growth
   reaches 5-6% with a stable currency, and falling inflation and
   unemployment. Considering the political culture in Ukraine,
   this scenario has to be considered relatively unlikely.

   (ii) Political tensions persist and parliamentary election is       A new parliamentary
   called: This is our main scenario and is considered the most        election would prolong
   likely. An election campaign makes it hard to restart               political uncertainty
   negotiations with the IMF, whose most important demands
   are fiscal reform and raising energy prices to market levels.
   International organisations are also cautious in increasing
   economic support beyond what has already been promised.
   Until the parliamentary election is held, probably sometime in
   May, there are no significant reforms and an economic
   recovery has to wait. Economic growth is expected to be
   slightly positive, while unemployment and inflation slowly
   ease, as in our macro forecast above.

   (iii) The political divide deepens. Protests spread among the
                                                                        New street protests
   population. An open, extra-parliamentary conflict results in a
                                                                        would lead to political
   situation similar to 2004, but with less legitimacy. Political
                                                                        chaos
   decision-making is paralysed and market actors within and
   outside Ukraine react by reducing investments and
   increasing capital outflows. It would be impossible for the
   IMF to restart negotiations on support measures and
   confidence in the hryvnia would erode. Inflation accelerates
   due to an increasing budget deficit and Ukraine finds it hard




Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010                                           7
to meet its foreign payments. Confidence is undermined and
                   the economy falls into a new recession.

               Even though the actions of the government and president are                         Global developments
               important to the stabilisation and reform process, Ukraine is                       are important to
               also highly dependent on global developments. A robust                              Ukraine, but
               recovery in global demand, together with stable financial                           sustainable growth
               markets, is critical to whether the Ukrainian economy will                          also requires reforms
               recover. This is not sufficient in the longer term, however, to                     and liberalisation
               achieve sustainable economic growth and thus improve the
               standard of living for a majority of the population. That would
               require genuine reforms in the public sector and extensive
               liberalisation of economy.



                                                                         Magnus Alvesson




Economic Research
Department
SE-105 34 Stockholm              Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis is published as a service to our customers.
Telephone +46-08-5859 1031       We believe that we have used reliable sources and methods in the
ek.sekr@swedbank.se
www.swedbank.se
                                 preparation of the analyses reported in this publication. However, we cannot
                                 guarantee the accuracy or completeness of the report and cannot be held
Legally responsible publishers   responsible for any error or omission in the underlying material or its use.
Cecilia Hermansson,
                                 Readers are encouraged to base any (investment) decisions on other
+46-8-5859 1588
                                 material as well. Neither Swedbank nor its employees may be held
                                 responsible for losses or damages, direct or indirect, owing to any errors or
Magnus Alvesson, +46-8-5859 3341 omissions in Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis.
Jörgen Kennemar, +46-8-5859 1478
ISSN 1103-4897




               8                                                           Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010

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Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23

  • 1. Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 10 January 2010 Ukraine After the Orange Revolution – political stability necessary for economic recovery • Ukraine’s presidential election on 7 February appears to have been a democratic success. Viktor Yanukovich, who was removed as president during the Orange Revolution, is the apparent winner. There is a big risk that political turbulence will persist, however, since Yulia Tymoshenko, the other candidate, continues to have support in parliament. • Ukraine’s economy bottomed out last fall and significant challenges still remain. The real economy has benefitted from a rise in global demand for commodities, while inflation and the exchange rate have stabilised. Huge imbalances persist, however. The budget deficit continues to grow and the natural gas sector is struggling with significant losses and increasing liabilities. Households have been hurt by rising unemployment, real wage decreases and an increase in real debt burdens. The necessary economic reforms will continue to hurt households in the short term. • Political co-operation will be critical to macroeconomic recovery. But the risks are great. One possibility is that early parliamentary elections are called, which would mean another election campaign. Greater turbulence remains a possibility. An alliance between the candidates would be the best way to agree on a difficult and unpopular economic stabilisation program to mitigate the crisis. In the medium term extensive reforms and liberalisations are needed to produce a higher and sustainable economic growth. Economic Research Department, Swedbank AB (publ), SE-105 34 Stockholm, tel +46 (0)8-5859 1028 e-mail: ek.sekr@swedbank.se Internet: www.swedbank.se Responsible publishers: Cecilia Hermansson +46 (0)8-5859 1588 Magnus Alvesson +46 (0)8-5859 3341, Jörgen Kennemar +46 (0)8-5859 1478 ISSN 1103-4897
  • 2. New president but political uncertainty prevails Ukraine appears to have conducted a largely free and fair Historic election election1, and voted the sitting president voted out of office and produces new brought in his replacement during a period of substantial president economic turbulence and global pressures. If the power shift is orderly, it would be a huge success for democracy in Ukraine, especially compared with many other former Soviet states. At the same time, however, politics in Ukraine are still overshadowed by the involvement of strong economic interests and by increasing scepticism about the political elite. Voter turnout is estimated by the election commission at 69%, against 77% in 2004. The key to increasing confidence in the political system is to strengthen the fight against corruption, while at the same time improving efficiency in the public sector. Former opposition leader Viktor Yanukovich appears to have Ukraine goes back to won the second round of the presidential election and returned the future for a to the centre of Ukrainian politics.2 He had been forced out of president the same post in 2004 by the Orange Revolution after winning a tainted election. Yanukovich’s political career began as a party functionary during the Soviet era, and he rose after Ukraine's independence to become prime minister under president Leonid Kuchma. Yanukovich’s principal support comes from the Russian-speaking eastern parts of the country, which are dominated by heavy industry. During the election campaign he increasingly distanced himself from Russia and expressed his support for economic stability policies. Yulia Tymoshenko was unsuccessful in convincing enough Conflicts within Orange voters who in the first round preferred one of the other coalition doomed candidates, and could not mobilising eligible voters that Tymoshenko abstained from voting. As the sitting prime minister and dominant political figure in recent years, Tymoshenko, together with outgoing president Viktor Yushchenko, has dropped in opinion polls as the economy has worsened. At the same time she has retreated from her previous West- and Europe-leaning policies. Her efforts to appease Russia through the natural gas agreement in December and diminished support for NATO membership appears to be an attempt to attract more Russian- speaking voters. The growing conflict between the former allies in the Orange Revolution, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko, undermined any opportunity either had to become president, however. 1 According to election observers from OSCE. 2 Results showed Yanukovich receiving 49.0% of the votes, against 45.5% for Tymoshenko. According to news reports, Tymoshenko is considering whether to demand a recount in certain districts. 2 Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010
  • 3. Opinion polls and the first round outcome of the presidential election (Percent of voters) 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 09 09 08 9 9 9 nd 9 9 9 9 /0 -0 -0 r/0 /0 /0 /0 g/ n/ p/ ou ug ov ov ec ct ct ap /j u se au -O -O tr /a /n /n /d 9/ 12 8/ 4/ 1s 14 01 31 25 29 13 Viktor Yanukovych Yulia Tymoshenko Serhiy Tihipko Viktor Yushchenko Source: Various opinion polls and election results from the first round Despite Yanukovich’s long, and not always flattering, history in New president but Ukrainian politics, there are hopes that his election will break uncertainty on new the paralysis in recent years caused by differences between political direction Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. Yanukovich has gathered a group of advisers who are considered competent and goal- oriented, and he has changed his position with regard to Russia and the rest of the world. In addition, Yanukovich has signalled that he will aim to restore negotiations with the IMF on the macroeconomic stabilisation program. At the same time he has stated that Ukraine should remain neutral between Russia and NATO. He also does not support membership in the EU, but has pushed for direct contacts in the form of bilateral agreements on natural gas deliveries, for example. The parliamentary situation remains complicated. Tymoshenko Political paralysis is prime minister and her bloc of three parties3 has had support could persist since the end of 2008 from the Lytvyn bloc, consisting of two parties4, as well as from Our Ukraine, the party of the current president Yushchenko. There have been a number of political manoeuvrings in recent years. In October 2008 Yushchenko dissolved parliament, but a new election could not be held after parliament ruled that it was a violation of the constitution and refused to grant the necessary financing. Yanukovich, as the newly elected president, can try to induce members of parliament to switch sides and support a new government loyal to him. If Tymoshenko retains her support, there is a significant risk that the country's leadership will remain bifurcated. Yanukovich could then call a new election to build a majority for his policies (provided that parliament accepts this), but this would mean another election campaign and more political indecisiveness. Ukraine faces considerable challenges both political and New political situation, economic. Corruption in politics and the public sector is but the seriousness of extensive, and oligarchs, the powerful business owners who in the economic situation many cases built their fortunes during the years following requires courage and independence, have considerable influence. The country also compromise faces decisive choices economically. Despite the high political 3 All-Ukrainian United Fatherland, Social Democratic and Reforms and Order parties. 4 People’s Party and Labour Party. Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010 3
  • 4. cost, reforms are needed to achieve a turnaround and create sustainable, dynamic development. This will require a willingness to compromise on the part of both the newly elected president and the opposition. Judging by the political climate in recent years, the likelihood of quick, effective decision-making is not especially high. Real economy has bottomed out, but it’s a long way back The severe economic slowdown eased at the end of last year. Hints of growing Preliminary data indicate that GDP fell by about 14%. This is exports at the end of a slightly better than expected, but at the same time was one of dark year the largest declines among major economies during the global downturn. Its dependence on steel exports and heavy industry made Ukraine vulnerable to the decline in global demand, at the same time that the financial system faced huge imbalances after years of rapid credit growth, especially with respect to loans in foreign currency. The recession bottomed out in the second half of 2009 and industrial production climbed as demand from Asia grew. The agricultural sector and food production have held up better and contribute to a stabilisation of the domestic economy. Still, the Ukrainian economy is significantly below its capacity ceiling and major imbalances remain. Real sector developments, 2006-2009 15 120 10 Index=100, same period 110 5 previous year 100 0 Percent -5 90 -10 80 -15 70 -20 -25 60 06-K3 07-K3 08-K3 09-K3 GDP (ann. change) Industrial production (real, r.s.) Agricultural production (real, r.s.) Source: Ukraine’s national bureau of statistics The domestic economy continues to struggle. While the export The domestic sector strengthened in late 2009, retail sales fell by over 20% in economy has been December 2009 and by an average of 19% for the year. The hard hit and is unlikely low level in 2009 would suggest positive growth numbers in to generate growth 2010, but at the same time many households face a difficult situation, and it will take time to recover to the levels before the crisis. Unemployment is rising and is expected to hit 9% in 2009, an increase of more than 3.5 percentage points compared with the previous year. Real wages have eroded and are estimated to have shrunk by nearly 10% in 2009. Add to that a growing debt burden, in no small part due to the large share of loans in foreign currency that many households and businesses have. 4 Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010
  • 5. At the same time that the current accounts deficit continues to Despite an improved decline, capital outflows are rising and a new balance of current account payments crisis remains a possibility. The majority of outflows balance, there is still a consist of debt service by companies and banks, and since risk of an external borrowing costs are increasing, it will be costly to refinance payment crisis loans. As a result, the country's currency reserves are shrinking. Currently there is enough reserves to cover payments, but the huge outflows are creating uncertainty about Ukraine’s solvency. Current account and the exchange rate, 2005-2009 10 9.0 8 8.0 6 Percent of GDP 4 7.0 2 0 6.0 -2 5.0 -4 -6 4.0 -8 -10 3.0 05-K1 05-K3 06-K1 06-K3 07-K1 07-K3 08-K1 08-K3 09-K1 09-K3 Current account USD/Hryvnia (r.s.) Source: Central bank of Ukraine Despite the turbulence in the financial markets, the Ukrainian The hryvnia has currency, the hryvnia, has remained remarkably stable after stabilised after a sharp falling substantially in late 2008 and early 2009. The significant depreciation, but is inflow of capital from the IMF and other public lenders has dependent on external added to the central bank’s reserves and can be used to support support the hryvnia, while at the same time growing exports and falling imports have reduced demand for foreign currency. Of course this also means that the hryvnia could again come under pressure without further international support and an improvement in foreign trade. Inflation has retreated from an annual level of over 30% in mid- Falling inflation and 2008 to just over 10% in late 2009. The major depreciation of low wage increases the hryvnia, which is giving inflation impulses, is outweighed by are making Ukraine weak domestic demand. The central bank has tightened its more competitive monetary policy as well. The money supply (M2) fell by 5% in internationally 2009 at the same time that the credit expansion slowed, primarily led by the decrease in lending in foreign currency. Falling inflation, coupled with lower nominal wage increases, is making Ukraine more competitive. Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010 5
  • 6. Inflation and wages, 2006-2009 (Annual change in percent) 50 40 30 20 10 0 -10 -20 jan/06 maj/06 sep/06 jan/07 maj/07 sep/07 jan/08 maj/08 sep/08 jan/09 maj/09 sep/09 Real w ages Wages (nominal) Inflation Source: Ukraine’s national bureau of statistics Transit trade in natural gas, a key sector of the Ukrainian Financial deficits and a economy, has stabilised this winter, but fundamental problems growing debt burden persist. Imported gas is the primary energy source in Ukraine are making the natural and significant revenue is generated from the transit trade. Last gas sector a ticking year's natural gas crisis, when Russia shut off deliveries to time bomb Ukraine, as a result of which large parts of Europe were left without energy supplies, has not been repeated this year. In December Prime Minister Tymoshenko signed an agreement with Russia stretching over 10 years that makes the natural gas and transit trade more predictable. Naftogaz, the state-owned energy company, continues to have serious profitability problems and a considerable debt burden. Last fall the government, in connection with the election campaign, refrained from raising energy prices at the consumer level despite that they represent only about a third of the import cost. As a result, Naftogaz’s cash flow is insufficient and the state has had to step in to help it pay its bills.5 Normalising Naftogaz would require substantially higher energy prices as well as a large capital infusion to reduce its debt burden. Both measures would be politically controversial. The growing budget deficit will be the biggest challenge to meet The budget deficit is following the election. During the campaign, spending was the biggest threat to allowed to grow. Promises made to large groups such as macroeconomic pensioners will be difficult to meet without sacrificing stability macroeconomic stability. Moreover, the government did not manage to get a 2010 budget passed by parliament. When it became obvious that the spending increases announced last fall could not be combined with the economic stability program, the IMF suspended payments in November 2009. Other international financiers are following suit and restrain their support, and uncertainty among many private actors is increasing. 5 In December of last year the IMF modified the economic stability programme and reduced the minimum level for the central bank’s international reserves to allow foreign payments for natural gas deliveries, among other things, to continue. 6 Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010
  • 7. Our macroeconomic forecast is cautious. Despite a slight Slow economic improvement late last year, the risks are significant. The political recovery forecast for uncertainty is already evident and the global economy shows Ukraine no signs of a rapid turnaround. We anticipate positive GDP growth in Ukraine of 2-3% in 2010 and 2011, while unemployment is expected to rise above 10% in 2010 before falling in the latter half of 2011. Uncertainty in the financial markets will increase pressure on the hryvnia, which is expected to depreciate slightly. Weak domestic demand will hold inflation in check, at the same time that higher energy prices and the weaker currency will create inflation impulses. Inflation is not expected to drop below 10% until 2011. Political developments are critical to economic stabilisation efforts The political process this spring will be decisive to whether Three scenarios Ukraine manages to reverse its stagnation and get its economy to recover and grow again. There are three plausible scenarios: (i) Political cooperation between president and prime An alliance could lead minister: Yanukovich and Tymoshenko agree to work to rapid stabilisation of together on economic stabilisation policies and succeed in the economy introducing major reforms to reduce the budget deficit and reform the energy sector. In this scenario the IMF starts reissuing payments at the same time that the private sector regains confidence in Ukraine and increases its investments. A relatively quick recovery begins and economic growth reaches 5-6% with a stable currency, and falling inflation and unemployment. Considering the political culture in Ukraine, this scenario has to be considered relatively unlikely. (ii) Political tensions persist and parliamentary election is A new parliamentary called: This is our main scenario and is considered the most election would prolong likely. An election campaign makes it hard to restart political uncertainty negotiations with the IMF, whose most important demands are fiscal reform and raising energy prices to market levels. International organisations are also cautious in increasing economic support beyond what has already been promised. Until the parliamentary election is held, probably sometime in May, there are no significant reforms and an economic recovery has to wait. Economic growth is expected to be slightly positive, while unemployment and inflation slowly ease, as in our macro forecast above. (iii) The political divide deepens. Protests spread among the New street protests population. An open, extra-parliamentary conflict results in a would lead to political situation similar to 2004, but with less legitimacy. Political chaos decision-making is paralysed and market actors within and outside Ukraine react by reducing investments and increasing capital outflows. It would be impossible for the IMF to restart negotiations on support measures and confidence in the hryvnia would erode. Inflation accelerates due to an increasing budget deficit and Ukraine finds it hard Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010 7
  • 8. to meet its foreign payments. Confidence is undermined and the economy falls into a new recession. Even though the actions of the government and president are Global developments important to the stabilisation and reform process, Ukraine is are important to also highly dependent on global developments. A robust Ukraine, but recovery in global demand, together with stable financial sustainable growth markets, is critical to whether the Ukrainian economy will also requires reforms recover. This is not sufficient in the longer term, however, to and liberalisation achieve sustainable economic growth and thus improve the standard of living for a majority of the population. That would require genuine reforms in the public sector and extensive liberalisation of economy. Magnus Alvesson Economic Research Department SE-105 34 Stockholm Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis is published as a service to our customers. Telephone +46-08-5859 1031 We believe that we have used reliable sources and methods in the ek.sekr@swedbank.se www.swedbank.se preparation of the analyses reported in this publication. However, we cannot guarantee the accuracy or completeness of the report and cannot be held Legally responsible publishers responsible for any error or omission in the underlying material or its use. Cecilia Hermansson, Readers are encouraged to base any (investment) decisions on other +46-8-5859 1588 material as well. Neither Swedbank nor its employees may be held responsible for losses or damages, direct or indirect, owing to any errors or Magnus Alvesson, +46-8-5859 3341 omissions in Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis. Jörgen Kennemar, +46-8-5859 1478 ISSN 1103-4897 8 Swedbank Baltic Sea Analysis No. 23 • 10 January 2010